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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 
 
By 
 
Yeongtae Jeon 
 
 
Technological, regulatory, and economic forces have been changing the 
telecommunications industry. Korea Telecom, the leading telecommunications 
company in Korea, is experiencing privatization, deregulation, and market opening 
which is resulting in the weakening of its monopolistic position.  
This paper aims to analyze the governance structure of telecommunications 
companies by reviewing the existing literature and conducting case studies of telcos in 
different stages of privatization. This study analyzes several telecommunications 
companies, such as AT&T and BT – the leading telcos with diffuse ownership – and 
Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom – those still regulated by their respective 
government.  
The key findings obtained through the case studies are as follows: 
First, this study did not find a significant relationship between firm performance 
and the composition of the board. Second, in the face of rapidly deregulating 
environment, the telcos have begun to give emphasis on the form of executive 
compensation by increasing the variable portion of the compensation. Finally, the 
market for corporate control is becoming an important mechanism for resolving 
owner-manager conflicts after privatization and deregulation. 
 iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION ……………………………………………………………... 1 
  
1.1. Background………………………………………………………………….. 1 
1.2. Purpose of the Study………………………………………………………… 2 
1.3. Organization of the Thesis…………………………………………………… 3 
  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ……………… 2 
  
2.1. Separation of Ownership and Management…………………………………. 4 
2.1.1. Agency Problem………………………………………………………. 4 
2.1.2. Deregulation and Agency Cost……………………………………….. 5 
2.2. Board of Directors………………..…………………………………………. 7 
2.2.1. Role and Responsibility………………………………………………. 7 
2.2.2. Composition of Board………………………………………………… 9 
2.3. Firm Performance and Director Compensation…………………………….. 11 
2.3.1. Relationship between Firm Performance and Director Compensation.. 11 
2.3.2. Deregulation and Executive Compensation………………..………… 14 
2.4. Role of External Market for Corporate Control…………………………….. 15 
  
3. ANALYSIS OF TELECOM COMPANIES’ GOVERNANCE 
STRUCTURE.…………………………………………………………………… 18 
  
3.1. Introduction………………………………………………………………….. 18 
3.2. AT&T Corp. ………………………………………………………………… 19 
3.2.1. Overview……………………………………………………………… 19 
3.2.2. Composition of Board………………………………………………… 20 
3.2.3. Principal Board Committees………………………………………….. 20 
3.2.4. Directors’ Compensation……………………………………………… 21 
3.3. British Telecom PLC………………………………………………………… 25 
3.3.1. Overview……………………………………………………………… 25 
3.3.2. Composition of Board………………………………………………… 25 
3.3.3. Principal Board Committees………………………………………….. 26 
3.3.4. Directors’ Compensation……………………………………………… 26 
3.4. Deutsche Telekom AG……………………………………………………… 29 
3.4.1. Overview……………………………………………………………… 29 
3.4.2. Composition of Board………………………………………………… 30 
3.4.3. Principal Board Committees………………………………………….. 31 
3.4.4. Directors’ Compensation……………………………………………… 32 
3.5. France Telecom……………………………………………………………… 33 
3.5.1. Overview……………………………………………………………… 33 
3.5.2. Composition of Board………………………………………………… 34 
3.5.3. Principal Board Committees………………………………………….. 35 
3.5.4. Directors’ Compensation……………………………………………… 35 
 v
3.6. Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation……………………………… 35 
3.6.1. Overview……………………………………………………………… 35 
3.6.2. Composition of Board………………………………………………… 36 
3.6.3. Directors’ Compensation……..………………………………………. 37 
3.7. Telecom Italia……………………………………………………………….. 37 
3.7.1. Overview……………………………………………………………… 37 
3.7.2. Composition of Board………………………………………………… 38 
3.7.3. Principal Board Committees………………………………………….. 38 
3.7.4. Directors’ Compensation……..………………………………………. 39 
3.7.5. Takeover Case: Telecom Italia and Olivetti…………………………... 41 
3.8. Telstra Corporation Limited………………………………………………… 43 
3.8.1. Overview……………………………………………………………… 43 
3.8.2. Composition of Board………………………………………………… 44 
3.8.3. Principal Board Committees………………………………………….. 44 
3.8.4. Directors’ Compensation…..…………………………………………. 45 
3.9. Korea Telecom Corp. ……………………………………………………….. 46 
3.9.1. Overview……………………………………………………………… 46 
3.9.2. Composition of Board………………………………………………… 47 
3.9.3. Principal Board Committees………………………………………….. 48 
3.9.4. Directors’ Compensation…..…………………………………………. 48 
  
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION……………………………………………… 50 
  
APPENDIX……………..…………………………………………………………… 53 
  
BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………………… 55 
 
  
 
 1
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
Technological, regulatory, and economic forces have been changing the 
telecommunications industry. Of the three, technology is the trigger of the changes. 
It is the near-exponential increases in capacity made possible by the latest optical-
fiber technology that are re-shaping telecommunications industries everywhere. The 
time is not far off when all the world's current voice traffic could be carried on a 
single pair of fibers the width of a human hair. Even today, that pair of fibers can 
carry all of North America's long-distance traffic. 
Another crucial element of the new technology is the move from the proprietary 
circuit-switched networks that carry the voice traffic, to a connectionless architecture, 
based on Internet protocols (IP), that can route packets of data to their destinations at 
high speed. IP technology is not only ideal for the growing convergence between 
voice, data and video; it is also indifferent to distance and quickly expandable.  
Relentless technological change is driving down many of the elements in the cost 
of a telephone call. Already, the cost of carrying an additional call is often so tiny that 
it might as well be free. As technological progress continues, telecommunications 
operators (hereafter telcos) are losing the benefit of economies of scale. 
There was a time when the telecom industry was a natural monopoly. Most 
governments liked it that way because they owned the monopoly and siphoned off 
some of the profits. Even now, most homes are served by only one wire, so customers 
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cannot switch telephone services in the way they can change their hairdresser. But as 
new technologies reduce the costs of entry, competition is spreading. Enthusiastically 
in some countries and gingerly in most, governments have begun to accept that 
competition offers the best way to ensure that changing technology is fully translated 
into lower tariffs. 
One of the features of the telecommunication industry trends is rapid privatization 
which is accompanied by deregulation. The flagship telcos of each country have 
experienced different paths of privatization and developed various governance 
structures. In privatizing government-owned enterprises, ownership and governance is 
a key issue.  
The contemporary governance debate increasingly focuses on what systems of 
governance best promote economic efficiency and generate “shareholder value”. An 
efficient corporate governance system would ensure that a firm is managed to increase 
its value to the shareholders and help achieve the socially efficient resource allocation. 
 
1.2 Purpose of the Study 
This paper aims to assess the governance structure of selected international telcos 
and derive implications for Korea Telecom. 
The proliferation of deregulation across many industries and abroad provides an 
opportunity for compiling cases on the evolution of governance structures and their 
adaptation to environmental shocks. Comparative-static analysis suggests that systems 
of management incentives and monitoring are likely to change after an industry is 
deregulated.  
 3
 
1.3 Organization of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 reviews the existing literature on corporate governance; namely, the role 
of board of directors; the relationship between firm performance and director 
compensation; and agency problem in the external market for corporate control. 
Chapter 3 analyzes the governance structure of seven telcos and evaluates Korea 
Telecom’s governance structure. Since the telcos are in different stages of 
privatization and deregulation, analysis of their respective governance structure could 
lead to a better understanding of corporate governance issues in the 
telecommunications industry.  
Chapter 4 summarizes the key findings of the study and develops some 
recommendations for Korea Telecom. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
2.1 Separation of Ownership and Management 
2.1.1 Agency Problem 
The definition of governance as the interaction between owners and managers in 
controlling and directing a company is commonly accepted and used. A broader 
definition would include “stakeholders” in addition to owners. 
The separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation, an issue 
brought to the fore so effectively by Berle and Means fifty years ago, retains a central 
position in writings about the economic theory of a firm. The problem is stated 
succinctly by Berle and Means: 
The separation of ownership from control produces a condition where the interests 
of owner and of ultimate manager may, and often do, diverge, and where many of the 
checks which formerly operated to limit the use of power disappear…. 
In creating these new relationships, the quasi-public corporation may fairly be said 
to work a revolution. It… has divided ownership into nominal ownership and the 
power formerly joined to it. Thereby the corporation has changed the nature of profit-
seeking enterprise. (Berle and Means, 1968) 
Berle and Means contend that managers do not have the same interest and 
motivation as the owners to make full and efficient use of the corporate assets. 
Consequently the owners had to introduce other means to ensure an alignment of 
owners’ and managers’ interests. Jensen and Meckling(1976) extended the argument 
by assessing the agency cost of this alignment. They define the shareholder 
relationship as one of agency 
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With management control, professional managers can maximize their own welfare, 
which may not be in the best interest of shareholders. For example, they may seek to 
benefit from the private consumption of corporate wealth or even make selfish 
investment decisions to protect their own job security rather than maximizing the 
return to shareholders. This moral-hazard problem arises when there is information 
asymmetry between the shareholders and managers. 
The potential conflict of interest between agents (managers) and principals 
(shareholders) incurs monitoring cost when shareholders try to set up a monitoring 
and bonding mechanism to prevent such abuse of corporate resources by the managers. 
Loss to their shareholders due to the incompleteness of the monitoring system will 
have to be borne by the shareholders as “agency costs”(Jensen and Meckling 1976) 
 
2.1.2 Deregulation and Agency Cost 
Deregulation increases the importance of the managerial function in the firm. 
Incentives to develop low-cost methods of production are muted under price and entry 
regulation. Price regulation and insulation from product-market competition also 
discourage firms from developing innovative pricing and distribution strategies. 
Regulation inhibits mergers and acquisition, either by explicitly discouraging the 
transactions or by limiting their potential gains. Removal of the profitability "safety 
net" provided by regulation introduces substantial downside risk: firms that make bad 
or unlucky decisions face extinction via bankruptcy or takeover. Managerial 
discretion increases under deregulation, as does the sensitivity of firm value to the 
quality of managerial decisions.  
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In addition to increasing the importance of the managerial function, deregulation 
increases the costs of observing managerial performance. Deregulation induces 
instability into the business environment. Greater instability makes it harder to 
distinguish the effects of management decisions on firm performance from the effects 
of other factors. By simultaneously increasing the role of managers and making their 
performance less observable, deregulation changes the nature and the severity of 
potential agency problems in firms. (Kole and Lehn 1997) 
A successful corporate governance system must accomplish the tasks of 
coordination and motivation. The decisions and actions of the interested parties, i.e. 
shareholders, management, and creditors and potential investors in the financial 
market, need to be coordinated to protect the shareholders’ interests and efficiently 
advance other corporate goals. An efficient corporate governance system would 
ensure that a firm is managed to increase its value to the shareholders, subject to legal 
and contractual constrains, and help achieve the socially efficient resource allocation 
given that financial and product markets relevant to the firm are properly functioning 
as well.  
With those tasks in mind, I will review some previous studies on the following 
aspects of corporate governance in the following sections 
• Internal corporate governance which concerns the means to protect the rights of 
stakeholders; the role and responsibility of the board of directors and its composition, 
the relation between firm performance and director remuneration 
• External corporate governance by the market for corporate control which 
concerns the relationship between the firm and potential investors in the stock market. 
I will cover studies on the agent problems in the external corporate governance. 
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2.2 Board of Directors and its Composition 
2.2.1 Role and Responsibility 
Boards of directors are a crucial part of the corporate structure. They are the link 
between the people who provide capital(shareholders) and the people who use that 
capital to create value(managers). The board’s primary role is to monitor management 
on behalf of the shareholders. This generally means that boards are the overlap 
between the small, powerful group that runs the company and a huge, diffuse, and 
relatively powerless group that simply wishes to see the company run well. 
Together with guiding corporate strategy, the board is chiefly responsible for 
monitoring managerial performance and achieving an adequate return for 
shareholders, while preventing conflicts of interest and balancing competing demands 
on the corporation. In order for boards to effectively fulfil their responsibilities they 
must have some degree of independence from management. Another important board 
responsibility is to implement systems designed to ensure that the corporation obeys 
applicable laws, including tax, competition, labor, environmental, equal opportunity, 
health and safety laws. In addition, boards are expected to take due regard of, and deal 
fairly with, other stakeholder interests including those of employees, creditors, 
customers, suppliers and local communities. 
 The board should fulfil certain key functions, including:  
1.Reviewing and guiding corporate strategy, major plans of action, risk policy, 
annual budgets and business plans; setting performance objectives; monitoring 
implementation and corporate performance; and overseeing major capital 
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expenditures, acquisitions and divestitures.  
2.Selecting, compensating, monitoring and, when necessary, replacing key  
executives and overseeing succession planning.  
3.Reviewing key executive and board remuneration, and ensuring a formal and 
transparent board nomination process.  
4.Monitoring and managing potential conflicts of interest of management, board 
members and shareholders, including misuse of corporate assets and abuse in 
related party transactions. 
5.Ensuring the integrity of the corporation’s accounting and financial reporting 
systems, including the independent audit, and that appropriate systems of 
control are in place, in particular, systems for monitoring risk, financial control, 
and compliance with the law. 
6.Monitoring the effectiveness of the governance practices under which it 
operates and making changes as needed.  
7.Overseeing the process of disclosure and communications. (OECD principles of 
corporate governance 1999) 
A critical issue in carrying out a board’s function is whether directors who are also 
members of the top management can be relied on to monitor and control what is 
effectively their own management performance. Exponents of the stewardship theory 
argue that power lies with the shareholders to choose the structure of their company’s 
board and the members of it, with independent external auditors appointed to report to 
the shareholders on the truth and fairness of the reports. 
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Agency theory, on the other hand, points to many examples of the abuse of power 
stemming from the domination of boards by the incumbent management, who have 
treated the company as though it were their personal property, and apparently acted in 
their own interests rather than those of the owners. Hence the argument that boards 
should have non-executive, outside directors who are genuinely independent of the 
business. 
 
2.2.2 Composition of the Board 
Board structures and procedures vary both within and among countries, due to 
political histories, laws and regulations, cultures, and paths of economic development. 
Some countries have two-tier boards that separate the supervisory function and the 
management function into different bodies. Such systems typically have a 
“supervisory board” composed of non-executive board members and a “management 
board” composed entirely of executives. Other countries have “unitary” boards, which 
bring together executive and non-executive board members.  
The experience of two-tier boards is principally in Continental Europe, and it is in 
Germany and the Netherlands that the idea has received its fullest development in the 
form of the mandatory “dualist” structures for certain kinds of company. The 
distinctive feature of these systems is that the shareholders have an opportunity to 
influence the composition of a body which has as its function the exercise of general 
and relatively continuous control and supervision over the activities of those 
managing the company’s affairs. The members of the supervisory body have the 
opportunity of scrutinizing the management of the company on behalf of the 
shareholders in a way the shareholders themselves, particularly small shareholders, 
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normally cannot. 
One trend that has characterized unitary boards has been the rise of the 
“independent” outside director. In order to be independent, a director must have no 
connection to the company other than the seat on the board. This excludes not just 
full-time employees of the company, but also family members of employees and the 
company’s lawyer, banker, and consultant. 
Independent board members can contribute significantly to the decision-making of 
the board. They can bring an objective view to the evaluation of the performance of 
the board and management. In addition, they can play an important role in areas 
where the interests of management, the company and shareholders may diverge such 
as executive remuneration, succession planning, changes of corporate control, take-
over defenses, large acquisitions and the audit function. 
Boards should consider assigning a sufficient number of non-executive board 
members capable of exercising independent judgement to tasks where there is a 
potential for conflict of interest. Examples of such key responsibilities are financial 
reporting, nomination and executive and board remuneration. While the responsibility 
for financial reporting, remuneration and nomination are those of the board as a whole, 
independent non-executive board members can provide additional assurance to 
market participants that their interests are defended. Boards may also consider 
establishing specific committees to consider questions where there is a potential for 
conflict of interest. These committees may require a minimum number or be 
composed entirely of non-executive members. A previous study documents that CEOs 
should be the only insider on the board (Jensen 1993) 
A recent research, on the other hand, observed no relationship between firm 
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performance and board composition (Mehran 1995). This lack of correlation has been 
interpreted by previous researchers as implying that boards are forsaking their 
obligations to shareholders. Directors, however, can design more efficient 
compensation packages that include equity-based compensation. Contracts that link 
executives’ compensation to the outcome of their actions reduce the effort and 
expertise required of directors for effective oversight. 
 
2.3 Firm Performance and Director Compensation 
2.3.1 Relationship between Firm Performance and Director Compensation 
Researchers have addressed the agency costs generated by the separation of 
ownership and control. Jensen and Meckling(1976) argued that ownership structure, 
executive compensation structure, and board composition are determined by each 
other and by the nature of a firm’s business (business risk, nature of real assets, cash 
flow pattern, and firm size). They suggested that these variables also influence a 
firm’s performance. Many devices have been suggested to improve the alignment of 
managers’ incentives with the interests of shareholders, including such devices as high 
corporate leverage, more effective monitoring by the board of directors, and 
managerial pay. 
Managerial pay has come under increasing scrutiny in the popular press. On one 
side of the debate are critics who suggest that chief executive officer (CEO) pay is not 
related to performance and is frequently ‘excessive’. Suggestions have ranged from 
capping CEO pay to making pay a prescribed multiple of the lowest worker’s salary. 
On the other side of the debate are proponents of moderate reform of the current 
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executive compensation system. 
Pay for performance is just as important with directors as it is with managers. As 
with managerial pay, the important question in director pay is not “how much” but 
“how”. The assumption of risk should be rewarded. If directors are prepared to link 
their own wealth to the performance of the company, then they should be paid more.  
Top managers, like most individuals, are portrayed as being risk-averse. This 
implies that managers will want their compensation structured so that they bear less 
personal risk. Given a certain level of compensation, managers should prefer fixed 
cash compensation over equity-based compensation. The latter, of course, is tied to 
the firm’s stock return and is to some degree beyond managers’ control. This 
preference is reinforced because the value of a manager’s human capital will also vary 
with the firm’s stock performance. In order to reduce their compensation risk, 
managers may engage in activities which reduce the firm’s risk (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). These activities in turn can adversely affect shareholders’ wealth. 
Shareholders, on the other hand, are considered risk-neutral because they can 
diversify firm-specific risk simply by holding a diversified portfolio. Moreover, 
shareholders will anticipate that managers will attempt to avoid risks in ways that can 
reduce firm value. While there are several ways to reduce this conflict over risk, 
previous research suggests that tying managers’ compensation to firm performance 
motivates them to make more value-maximizing decisions. Some studies suggest that 
one specific way to tie pay to performance is by making a greater percentage of a 
manager’s compensation equity-based, such as through incentive stock options. Other 
researchers have formally shown that incentive-compensation plans motivate 
managers to take on more risk. For these reasons, shareholders should prefer, holding 
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the level of compensation constant, that managers’ pay packages contain more equity-
based forms of compensation. 
Shareholders do not set executive compensation. They elect directors, who have 
the exclusive right under corporate law to manage the corporation. Among the most 
important of directors’ tasks is to set the level and structure of the compensation of 
top executives, which raises the issue of how the composition of the board affects the 
structure of executive compensation. There is a growing body of evidence that outside 
directors are more independent of top management and thus better represent the 
interest of shareholders than do inside directors. 
 Mehran(1995) examined the relationship between the composition of the board 
and the structure of executive compensation. The study focused on the structure rather 
than the level of compensation and it investigated executive compensation in the 
context of the firm’s ownership structure and the composition of this board of 
directors. Mehran(1995) documented his findings on compensation structure as 
follows: (1) firms with more outside directors have a higher percentage of their 
executive compensation in equity-based form; (2) the percentage of executive 
compensation that is equity-based is inversely related to their percentage of equity 
holdings; and (3) firms in which a higher percentage of the shares are held by outside 
blockholders use less equity-based compensation. His findings on firm performance, 
as proxied by Tobin’s Q and by return on assets, are as follows: (1) firm performance 
is positively related to the percentage of executive compensation that is equity-based; 
and (2) firm performance is positively related to the percentage of equity held by 
managers. These findings support tying executive compensation more closely to firm 
performance (as measured by stock price or other indicators); they also suggest that 
the form, rather than the level, of compensation is what motivates managers to 
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increase firm value. The results on firm performance indicate that both Tobin’s Q and 
return on assets are positively related to both the percentage of executives’ total 
compensation that is equity-based and the percentage of shares held by top managers. 
Thus compensation does affect CEO incentives in ways that have a measurable 
impact on corporate efficiency (Mehran 1995). However, the study is exploratory in 
that executive compensation, ownership structure, and board composition are 
ultimately part of a simultaneous system that determines the corporation’s value and 
the allocation of that value among various claimants. As a result, the association are 
not necessarily causal ones. Nevertheless, empirical regularities in the structure of 
executive compensation help understand the role of director remuneration. 
Regarding the relationship between firm performance and outside directors’ equity 
holdings, studies have different arguments. In contrast with the finding of Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny(1988), Mehran(1995) found no significant relationship between 
firm performance and outside directors’ equity holdings. Unless a substantial 
component of outside directors’ compensation is tied to the firm’s performance (e.g., 
through stock options), their capital risk may not be large enough to motivate them 
monitor the management team. 
 
 
2.3.2 Deregulation and Executive Compensation 
CEO pay has been examined empirically by previous studies and all found a 
positive relation between pay and performance for samples of publicly-held 
corporations. Jensen and Murphy(1990) examined the link between changes in 
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shareholder wealth and CEO pay and found a significant positive relation between 
pay and performance. However, they find only a $3.25 change in CEO wealth per 
$1,000 change in shareholder wealth. They attribute this small sensitivity to public 
and private political forces influencing the managerial compensation market, noting 
that managerial compensation is highly visible and attracts ‘implicit regulation’ that 
truncates the upper tail of managerial compensation. They suggest that to align 
managerial incentives with shareholders’ interests, caps on managerial salaries should 
be eliminated and the sensitivity of compensation to performance should be enhanced 
to reward the better performing managers.  
Hubbard and Palia(1995) examined CEO pay in the banking industry and the 
effect of deregulating the market for corporate control markets. They find (1) higher 
levels of pay in competitive corporate control markets, (2) a stronger pay-performance 
relation in deregulated markets, and (3) CEO turnover increases substantially after 
deregulation. While such results must be interpreted with caution, they are consistent 
with the idea that restricting pay levels of chief executive officers reduces the 
effectiveness of a well-functioning managerial labor market and its associated pay 
structure in attracting talented managers to challenging careers. 
 
2.4 Role of External Market for Corporate Control 
The takeover process itself, however, has been considered as a mechanism for 
resolving owner-manager conflicts. Given the difficulty individual shareholders have 
in replacing inefficient managers, poorly performing firms may be valued below their 
potential in the marketplace. These firms become attractive targets for bidders who 
can correct inefficiencies. These forces the pre-takeover management of the target 
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firms to renegotiate for employment with either its old firm or a new one. Fama 
(1980) suggests that the need to “settle up” discipline managers. The threat of 
takeover should improve this process. 
A previous research found that internally precipitated complete turnover of the top 
management team, which should be successful monitoring by board, is more likely to 
occur in firms that under-perform in troubled industries than in healthy industries. In 
addition, internally caused complete turnover is less prevalent in firms run by 
founders or “one-man” management teams. In contrast, hostile takeovers, which they 
associated with the board’s failure to discipline managers, are predictable based on 
poor performance of the whole industry, and are disproportionately targeted at firms 
with “one-man” management teams. Finally, to the extent that they are disciplinary, 
friendly acquisitions seem to be encouraged by corporate boards that are faced with 
poor performance relative to a healthy industry (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1989).  
However, to the extent that internal control devices are cheaper to operate and are 
more conductive to long-term planning by incumbent management than are hostile 
takeovers, the replacement of the oversight function of the board by the external 
market for corporate control might be deemed a third-best situation. 
 
Agency Problem in the Case of Tender Offer 
Employment of agents has been shown to allow impediments to shareholder 
wealth maximization because the best interest of agents may differ from the best 
interest of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Resolution of these differences 
may generate agency costs. The potential for this conflict is exceedingly high in the 
 17
case tender offer. Managers of target firms may be faced with a conflict of interest 
between their fiduciary responsibilities and their own potential wealth changes. 
Managers who believe that a tender offer is in the best interest of their shareholders 
may, nevertheless, find themselves unemployed if the bid is successful. For these 
reasons, tender offers provide an ideal vehicle for the analysis of agency conflicts. 
The finding of Walkling and Long (1984) is that the existence or absence of bid 
resistance is found to be directly related to the personal wealth changes of the target 
firm’s managers.  
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ANALYSIS OF TELECOM COMPANIES’  
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Governance structures vary due to political histories, laws and regulations, cultures, 
and paths of economic development. Some countries have two-tier boards that 
separate the supervisory function and the management function into different bodies. 
Other countries have "unitary" boards, which bring together executive and non-
executive board members. When evaluating governance model relevance, one should 
take into account the capital market structure, government regulations, and structure 
of shareholding.  
One of the features of the telecommunication industry trends is rapid privatization 
accompanied by deregulation. The flagship telcos of each country have experienced 
different paths of privatization and developed unique governance structure 
respectively.  
This chapter examines the composition of the board of directors, the compensation 
scheme, and other governance matters of seven telcos. After that, I will evaluate the 
governance structure of Korea Telecom. The seven telcos are AT&T Corp. (hereafter 
AT&T), British Telecom PLC (hereafter British Telecom), Deutsche Telekom AG 
(hereafter Deutsche Telekom), France Telecom, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone 
Corporation (hereafter NTT), Telecom Italia SPA (hereafter Telecom Italia), and 
Telstra Corp LTD (hereafter Telstra). The government ownership of the selected telcos 
ranges from zero to seventy-four percent due to the difference in the privatization 
stage. 
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Board structures and size vary among the telcos. AT&T has a unitary board which 
bring together executive and non-employee board members. DT has, on the other 
hand, a two-tier board that separates the supervisory function and the management 
function into different bodies. 
 
3.2 AT&T Corp. 
3.2.1 Overview 
AT&T is one of the worlds largest communications services providing voice, data 
and video telecommunications services to businesses large and small, consumers and 
government entities. The company provides billing, directory and calling card 
services to support its communications business. AT&T has established alliances & 
joint ventures in major foreign markets with prominent telecommunication companies. 
The number of employees is 107,800 and total assets amount to USD 59,550 mil on 
December 31, 1998. 
AT&T has diffuse share ownership. The only entity with more than 5% of the 
issued and outstanding shares of AT&T common stock had 5.242% as of December 
31, 1998. The directors and executive officers as a group have 2,030,636 shares, 
which is about 0.13% of total shares.  
AT&T has a unitary board with majority of non-employee directors. Its 
compensation scheme puts emphasis on aligning directors’ interests with shareholders 
by increasing the variable portion of the remuneration and using long-term incentive 
plans. 
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3.2.2 Composition of Board 
AT&T’s board consist of eight non-employee directors and two executive ones. 
CEO is also the chairman of the board, which reflects US business culture. In 76 
percent of the largest US companies, the chief executive is the chairman of the board. 
In England, by contrast, the figure is roughly reversed, with only one third of the 
largest companies having a joint CEO/Chairman. 
 
3.2.3 Principal Board Committees 
AT&T’s three principal committees are as follows: 
(1) Audit Committee meets with management to consider the adequacy of the 
internal controls and the objectivity of financial reporting. The committee consists of 
six non-employee directors. 
(2) Compensation and Employee Benefits Committee administers management 
incentive compensation plans, including stock option plans, and keeps informed and 
advises the board regarding employee benefit plans. The committee consists of five 
non-employee directors. 
(3) Governance and Nominating Committee, advises and makes recommendations 
to the board on all matters concerning directorship and corporate governance practices, 
including compensation of directors and the selection of candidates as nominees for 
election as directors, and it provides guidance with respect to matters of public policy. 
The committee consists of four non-employee directors and one employee director. 
3.2.4 Directors’ Compensation 
 21
AT&T's programs aim to provide executives with a competitive earnings 
opportunity, with earnings linked to the short-term and long-term performance of the 
company and the sustained performance of the individual. 
The compensation principles are as follows: competitiveness, performance 
contingency, accountability to stakeholders, balance between short-term and long-
term performance, and tax effectiveness. 
The remuneration package for executive directors consists of three key elements: 
(1) Base salary, (2) Short-term incentives, i.e., annual bonus; and (3) Long-term 
incentives, i.e., performance shares, stock options, and restricted stock. 
 
Base Salary 
AT&T determines the salary ranges for each of the executive officer positions 
based upon the scope, level and strategic impact of the position, and on the pay levels 
of similarly positioned executive officers in comparable companies. Consistent with 
aligning compensation with shareholder interests and cost control, no salary increases 
were made for executive officers or other senior managers of the company in 1998. 
 
Annual Bonus 
The annual bonus for other executive officers is based on the company's financial 
and key non-financial results as measured against pre-set targets for (1) Earnings Per 
Share; (2) Revenue Growth; (3) Reduction in sales, general &administrative expense; 
(4) Customer value added, which measures the relative value that customers perceive 
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when AT&T’s services are compared with those of competitors; and (5) People value 
added, which measures employee views regarding leadership and contributions to the 
diversity of the company. 
 
Long Term Incentives: Performance Shares, Stock Options, and Restricted Stock 
Long-term incentives provide a mechanism for aligning the economic interests of 
executive officers with those of shareholders. Grants of stock options and 
performance shares are made annually under the AT&T 1997 Long Term Incentive 
Program. 
Performance Shares: Performance shares, which are awards of units equivalent in 
value to shares of AT&T common stock, are awarded annually in numbers based on 
surveys of competitive market grant levels for similar positions. Prior to 1997, payout 
of 0% to 150% of such performance shares was made in the form of cash and/or 
shares of AT&T common stock (with a required minimum of 50% in shares) at the 
end of a three-year performance period based on the company's return to equity 
("RTE") performance compared with a target. In 1997, the company re-instituted a 
performance share program tied to three-year relative total shareholder return ("TSR") 
as measured against a peer group of industry competitors. TSR equals the sum of the 
appreciation in the price of AT&T common stock plus dividends paid over the period. 
Stock Options: Stock options are granted annually to executive officers based on 
surveys of competitive grant levels for similar positions. Stock options are granted 
with an exercise price equal to or greater than the fair market value of AT&T common 
stock on the day of grant, and become exercisable after the expiration of a period of 
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time, typically between one and six years, and continue to be exercisable until ten 
years from the date granted. Such stock options provide incentive for the creation of 
shareholder value over the long term since the full benefit of the compensation 
package cannot be realized unless an appreciation in the price of AT&T common 
stock occurs over a specified number of years. 
Restricted Stock: Restricted stock and restricted stock unit awards are granted 
occasionally to executive officers under the AT&T 1997 Long Term Incentive 
Program, primarily for purposes of retention. Restricted stock is subject to forfeiture 
and may not be disposed of by the recipient until certain restrictions established by the 
committee lapse. Recipients of restricted stock are not required to provide 
consideration other than the rendering of services or the payment of any minimum 
amount required by law. 
 
Other Remuneration: Pensions and Insurance 
Pensions: Effective December 31, 1996, AT&T terminated its pension plan for 
non-employee directors.  
Insurance: AT&T provides non-employee directors with travel accident insurance 
when on company business. A non-employee director may purchase life insurance 
sponsored by AT&T. 
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Non-Employee Directors’ Remuneration 
In 1998, directors who were not employees received an annual cash retainer of 
$45,000 and stock units with a then-current market value of $45,000, which were 
deferred automatically and credited to a portion of a deferred compensation account, 
pursuant to AT&T’s deferred compensation plan for non-employee directors. The 
chairpersons of the Audit Committee, Compensation and Employee Benefits 
Committee, and Finance Committee each received an additional annual retainer of 
$7,500.  The chairperson of the Governance and Nominating Committee received an 
additional annual retainer of $5,000. No fees are paid for attendance at regularly 
scheduled board and committee meetings. Directors received a fee of $1,500 for each 
special board or committee meeting attended. Directors may elect to defer the receipt 
of all or part of their cash retainer and other compensation into the AT&T shares 
portion or the cash portion of the deferred compensation account. 
 
Director Share Ownership Targets 
Effective December 1997, the board adopted share ownership targets equal to five 
times the total value of the annual cash retainer and annual stock unit amounts. 
Although directors generally have five years to attain the ownership goal, nine of the 
non-employee directors have already met their target. Directors who are employees of 
AT&T receive no compensation for serving as directors, but also have ownership 
targets. 
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3.3 British Telecom PLC 
3.3.1 Overview 
British Telecommunications PLC supplies inland and international 
telecommunication services within the United Kingdom and overseas. Its main 
products and services include local, long-distance and international calls; telephone 
lines, equipment and private circuits for homes and businesses; providing and 
managing private networks; and supplying mobile communications services. The 
number of employees is 124,700 and total assets amount to GBP 23,285 mil on 31 
Mar., 1998. 
British Telecom has diffuse share ownership. The interests of directors and their 
families in the company’s shares are 275,650 shares, which is about 0.0043% of total 
ordinary shares.  
British Telecom has a unitary board with majority of non-executive directors and 
separates CEO and Chairman position. Its compensation scheme has similar features 
to that of AT&T, which is a result of competing for qualified executives in the global, 
and particularly, US markets. Its compensation scheme also aims to align directors’ 
interests with shareholders by increasing the variable portion of the remuneration and 
using long-term remuneration. 
 
3.3.2 Composition of Board 
BT aims to have the board comprise approximately two-thirds non-executive 
directors. Among the eleven members, seven non-executive directors are independent 
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of the management of BT either being free from any business or other relationship 
which could materially interfere with the exercise of their judgement or not previously 
involved in the management of BT. CEO does not hold the position of chairman of the 
board.  
 
3.3.3 Principal Board Committees 
British Telecom’s three principal committees are as follows: 
(1) Nominating committee consists of chairman, deputy chairman and four other 
non-executive directors, (2) Audit Committee consisting solely of non-executive 
directors, and (3) Remuneration Committee consists solely of independent non-
executive directors. 
 
3.3.4 Directors’ Compensation 
British Telecom’s executive remuneration policy is to reward employees 
competitively taking into account performance, market value and competitive 
pressures in the communications and information technology sectors.  
The remuneration package for executive directors comprises basic salary, annual 
bonus, long-term remuneration, share option scheme and pensions. 
 
Basic Salary 
Salaries are reviewed (although not necessarily increased) annually. Salaries are 
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increased only where the committee believes that market adjustments are appropriate 
to reflect performance, increased responsibilities and/or market pressures.  
 
Annual Bonus 
The annual bonus plan is designed to focus on annual objectives and to reward 
senior executives appropriately for the results achieved against these objectives. 
Targets are set at the start of the financial year based on key corporate objectives – 
such as revenue growth, profitability, quality of service, customer satisfaction and 
people management. Specific weights are attached to each objective on the basis of 
the BT Corporate Scorecard. Bonus awards for executive directors for the year under 
review ranged from 41% to 65% of salary.  
 
Long-Term Incentives 
BT Long Term Remuneration Plan: The BT Long Term Remuneration Plan 
(‘LTRP’) was designed to ensure that British Telecom’s remuneration package 
remains competitive, to encourage personal investment in British Telecom shares, to 
foster community of interest with shareholders, to encourage key executives to stay 
with British Telecom and to link reward and long-term corporate performance more 
effectively. Under the plan, shares are awarded to participants conditionally on the 
company meeting a pre-determined corporate performance measure and, normally, the 
participants still being employed by the British Telecom Group at the end of a five-
year period. The performance measure is British Telecom’s total shareholder return 
(‘TSR’) relative to the FT-SE 100.  
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BT Performance Share Plan: Under the PSP, shares are conditionally awarded to 
participants on the basis that they will only be entitled to these shares in full at the end 
of a three-year period if the company has met a pre-determined corporate performance 
measure and the participants are still employed by the British Telecom Group. The 
performance measure is the same as for the LTRP. 
 
Other Remuneration: BT Share Option Scheme and Pensions 
BT Share Option Scheme: The BT Share Option Scheme for senior executives 
was not renewed after its expiry in January 1995. The last options were granted in 
December 1994. 
Pensions: For executive directors and other senior executives the policy is to 
provide pension benefits of one thirtieth of final salary for each year of service with a 
two-thirds surviving spouse’s pension. Pensions are based on salary alone – bonuses, 
other benefits and long-term incentives are excluded. 
 
Non-Executive Directors’ Remuneration 
The Board has delegated the determination of remuneration for non-executive 
directors to the Chairman and Chief Executive. The basic fee for non-executive 
directors, which includes membership of one committee, is £25,000 per year. 
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3.4 Deutsche Telekom AG 
3.4.1 Overview 
Deutsche Telekom, the former German state owned telecommunications company 
which is publicly traded since 1996, operates and maintains telephone networks and is 
involved in the mobile telecommunications market. The company is the largest 
provider of telecommunications services in Europe and the third largest in the world. 
In addition to telephone services, Telekom is involved in satellite operations, cable TV 
transmission (via its wide-frequency network), video conferencing, audiovisual & 
textual data transmission and multimedia & online services. The number of 
employees is 203,374 and total assets amount to DEM 155,078 mil on 31 Dec 1998. 
The Federal Republic held an approximate 48.2% direct stake in Deutsche 
Telekom and an indirect investment through KfW interest of approximately 23.8% at 
March 31, 1999.1  
Deutsche Telekom’s board has typical features of two-tier board. This system has 
“supervisory board” composed of non-executive board members and “management 
board” composed entirely of executives. Half of the supervisory board represent the 
employees. 
 
 
                                                          
1 As part of the legislative process relating to the enactment of Postreform II, the responsible 
legislative committee stated in its statement of legislative intent that the Federal Republic 
would de facto retain a majority shareholding in Deutsche Telekom for a number of years 
because the sale of Shares by the Federal Republic is, in principle, prohibited through 
December 31, 1999. Until December 31, 1997, the regulatory function was exercised by the 
Post Ministry. Thereafter, the new regulatory authority, which is administered by the 
Economics Ministry, took over this function. 
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3.4.2 Composition of Board 
As required by the German Stock Corporation Act, Deutsche Telekom has a two-
tier board system consisting of a Board of Management and a Supervisory Board. The 
board of management is responsible for managing Deutsche Telekom and 
representing Deutsche Telekom in its dealings with third parties, while the 
supervisory board appoints and removes the members of the board of management 
and oversees the management of Deutsche Telekom. Under the German Stock 
Corporation Act, the supervisory board is not permitted to make management 
decisions. Pursuant to the Articles of Association of Deutsche Telekom and the By-
laws (Geschäftsordnung) of the board of management, the board of management must 
obtain the consent of the supervisory board for certain actions, including acquisitions 
or dispositions of real property having a value of more than DM 50 million, 
acquisitions or dispositions of equity investments, the appointment of members of the 
supervisory board or other bodies having supervisory functions of direct or indirect 
subsidiaries with a share capital of more than DM 5 million or an annual turnover of 
more than DM 50 million, and actions concerning the corporate structure or the 
strategy of Deutsche Telekom. In addition, under the German Stock Corporation Act, 
the supervisory board is authorized to subject other actions of the board of 
management to its consent. As a result of the Law Amending the German Stock 
Corporation Act (KonTraG), the supervisory board now has extended monitoring 
functions. The German Stock Corporation Act prohibits simultaneous membership on 
the management board and the supervisory board of a company.  
Supervisory Board: In accordance with Deutsche Telekom’s Articles of 
Incorporation, the supervisory board of Deutsche Telekom consists of twenty 
members, ten of whom represent the shareholders and ten of whom represent the 
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employees. Members of the supervisory board may be elected for a term of up to five 
years. The supervisory board members representing the shareholders are elected at a 
general meeting of the shareholders. The supervisory board elects a chairman and a 
deputy chairman from among its members; in the event that a majority of two thirds 
of the members of the supervisory board is not achieved, the shareholder 
representatives elect the Chairman and the employee representatives elect the Deputy 
Chairman.  
As a result of a change in certain legal requirements with respect to the supervisory 
boards of German companies, Dr. Klaus Götte left the supervisory board with effect 
from April 30, 1998. This supervisory board position was filled by Michel Bon (from 
June 4, 1998), the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of France Telecom, in 
connection with an exchange of directors with France Telecom. 
Board of Management: Pursuant to Deutsche Telekom’s Articles of Incorporation, 
the supervisory board determines the size of the board of management, subject to the 
requirement that the board of management must have at least two members. The 
supervisory board may appoint a Chairman of the board of management as well as a 
Deputy Chairman. The members of the board of management are appointed by the 
supervisory board for a term of up to five years.  
 
3.4.3. Principal Board Committees 
DT’s five principal committees are as follows: 
(1) a mediation committee, (2) a personnel committee, (3) a committee for 
extraordinary matters and (4) a presiding committee. All committees have an equal 
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number of shareholder representatives and employee representatives. The chairman of 
the supervisory board is the chairman of the mediation committee and the presiding 
committee where he has the deciding vote in case of a tie. In the other committees, the 
chairman does not have the deciding vote in case of a tie. The chairman of the 
personnel committee is a representative of the employees. 
 
3.4.4 Directors’ Compensation 
In addition to reimbursement of actual out-of-pocket expenses, members of the 
supervisory board receive a fee of DM 250 as compensation in respect of imputed 
out-of-pocket expenses and an annual payment, the amount of which will be 
determined by the shareholders’ meeting on May 27, 1999. The proposed annual 
compensation for 1998 is DM 48,000 for the chairman, DM 36,000 for the deputy 
chairman and at DM 24,000 for each remaining member of the supervisory board. 
Remuneration was paid to members of the supervisory board of Deutsche Telekom  
in 1998 in the amount of DM 492,000, inclusive of meeting expenses of DM 36,000. 
The remuneration of the board of management of Deutsche Telekom amounts to 
DM 9,174,787.46. The remuneration package for the board of management comprises 
guaranteed portion (base salary), variable portion (annual bonus). The variable portion 
is dependent upon a number of criteria, including the attainment of certain financial 
performance objectives and the achievement of certain individual performance 
objectives. For the year ended December 31, 1998, 36.3% of the total remuneration 
was paid pursuant to such bonus arrangement.  
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Stock Option 
Subject to the approval of the supervisory board and the shareholders’ meeting, a 
stock option program for the members of the board of management is to be introduced 
in the year 2000. 
 
Other Remuneration 
Pension: Pension accruals totaling DM 7,912,363 have been established for the 
board of management 
 
3.5 France Telecom 
3.5.1. Overview 
France Telecom operates the French telecommunications system and manufactures 
and distributes telephone products, fax machines and mobile phones. It is also 
responsible for the construction and maintenance of telephone lines and 
telecommunications networks. France Telecom offers a wide range of services, to 
companies as well as to individual customers, including the public phone network, 
phone card vending machines, a large number of “Publifax” (public fax machines) 
and directory inquiries services. France Telecom is also active in the visual and audio 
communications sectors, through the production, transmission and broadcasting of 
programs. In 1997 France Telecom became publicly held and in the same year the 
company began the sale of its first mobile phones and it also signed contracts with 
both the Senegalese and Vietnamese governments concerning various different 
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business ventures. The number of employees is 165,042 and total assets amount to 
FRF 287,197 mil on 30 June, 1998. 
The French State2 held an approximate 63.6% direct stake in France Telecom at 
March 31, 1999. The members of the board of directors and of the executive 
committee collectively owned a total of approximately 23,200 shares, which is about 
0.0023% of total shares.  
France Telecom’s board has mostly unitary board features, however, it 
distinguishes itself from that of British Telecom or AT&T with the presence of one-
third of the board elected by the employees. 
 
3.5.2 Composition of Board 
FT Board consists of (1) four Members elected by the annual shareholders 
meeting; (2) ten Members appointed by decree of the French state; (3) seven 
Members elected by employees; (4) three Observers appointed by the board of 
directors. Michel Bon, Chairman and CEO, is the only executive officer in the board. 
There are nine executive officers, including CEO. Though one-third of the directors 
elected by employees, this structure does not assume equality between capital and 
labor since the chairman come from the shareholder side. 
 
 
                                                          
2 In accordance with the legislation applicable to state-owned corporations, France Telecom 
and its subsidiaries are subject to the rules related to the economic and financial control of the 
French State. A representative of the French State appointed by the minister is entitled to 
attend all meetings of the board of directors as an observer. 
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3.5.3 Principal Board Committees 
FT’s two principal committees are as follows: 
(1) Audit committee consists of directors appointed by decree of the French state, 
and (2) Compensation committee consists one director elected by shareholders and 
two directors appointed by decree of the French state. 
 
3.5.4 Directors’ Compensation 
The total amount of remuneration allotted to the directors and members of the 
Executive Committee totaled FF 16.6 million in 1998. The directors representing the 
French State or who are France Telecom employees do not receive any remuneration 
for their term of office. Only expenses linked to their attendance at meetings are 
reimbursed. Directors appointed by the general meeting do not collect attendance fees. 
 
3.6 Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation 
3.6.1 Overview 
NTT is the largest provider of telecommunications services in Japan. Its business is 
providing nationwide telecommunications services. These services fall into six major 
classes: telephone services, telegraph services, leased circuit services, data 
communication facility services, sale of telecommunication equipment and other 
services.  
The Government of Japan held an approximate 65.49% direct stake in NTT at 
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March 31, 1998.3 The appointment of the Company's directors and corporate auditors 
is subject to approval by MPT. The members of the board of directors and officers 
collectively owned a total of approximately 409.44 shares, which is about 0.003% of 
total shares.  
NTT was established under the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation Law 
(the "NTT Law") and is responsible for providing nationwide telephone services and 
for promoting research in telecommunications technologies and disseminating the 
results of such research. The number of employees is 226,000 and total assets amount 
to USD 131,459 mil on 31 Mar., 1998. 
NTT’s board size is the largest among the selected telcos’ and the board consists 
mostly of executive directors. 
 
3.6.2 Composition of Board 
The Board of Directors currently consists of 36 members, of whom 35 are also 
executive officers of the Company as of June 26, 1998. Directors are elected for a 
two-year term. 
 
 
                                                          
3 The Diet passed the Revision Law in June 1997. The Revision Law implements a plan 
proposed by the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, and accepted in principle by the 
Company, to reorganize the Company. Under the Revision Law, the Company will continue to 
exist but will operate primarily as a holding company with its businesses reorganized into 
three newly established companies, East-Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, West-
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation and the Long Distance Company. The Revision 
Law continues to require the Government to own one-third or more, and restricts foreign 
ownership to less than 20%, of the total number of issued Shares. 
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3.6.3 Directors’ Compensation 
During fiscal year 1998, the aggregate amount of compensation paid by the 
Company to all Directors, executive officers and corporate auditors as a group was 
1,228 million Yen.  
 
3.7 Telecom Italia 
3.7.1 Overview 
Telecom Italia (formerly known as Societa Finanziaria Telefonica per Azioni-
STET) provides telecommunications services and is Italy's leading manufacturer of 
telecommunications products. The company also manufactures specific electronic 
components, installs telecommunications systems & provides publishing, marketing 
& financial support services. In 1997, STET absorbed Telecom Italia and changed 
name to Telecom Italia. The number of employees is 126,097 and total assets amount 
to ITL 83,293,000 mil on 30 Jun., 1998. 
The Government held an approximate 5.17% direct stake in Telecom Italia, and the 
stable shareholders4 owned, in the aggregate, 8.11% of the shares at March 31, 1999. 
The members of the board of directors and executive officers collectively owned a 
total of approximately 29,957 shares, which is about 0.0006% of total shares. 
                                                          
4 In connection with the privatization of Telecom Italia, the government entered into separate 
agreements with 14 stable shareholders, which agreed not to act in concert and which in the 
aggregate represented approximately 9.02% of the outstanding shares. The sale to the stable 
shareholders was intended to establish a degree of stability and continuity in the shareholding 
of the company following the privatization. The sale of the shares in the private sale was 
completed shortly after completion of the privatization. The stable shareholders, however, did 
not provide enough stability to the directors in the face of the hostile takeover offer from 
Olivetti. 
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Telecom Italia has a unitary board with “voto di lista” system which aimed at 
ensuring greater protection for minority shareholders. 
 
3.7.2 Composition of Board 
Telecom Italia’s corporate governance bodies consists of Board of directors and 
General managers. Telecom Italia’s board consists of thirteen members, including two 
directors appointed by the Italian government. Telecom Italia does not have joint 
Chairman/CEO. The general managers consist of three executive officers, which are 
responsible for the day-to-day administration of the operation within their respective 
spheres of competences. 
 
3.7.3 Principal Board Committees 
Telecom Italia’s principal board committees are as follows: 
(1) The Executive Committee consists of at least three and no more than four 
members, in addition to the chairman, the deputy chairman and the CEO. Pursuant to 
the Public Concessions, the director designated by the Ministry of Communication 
must be a member of the Executive Committee, if such committee exists. 
(2) The Audit and Corporate Governance Committee has an advisory and 
investigative role in the areas of accounting, corporate governance and internal audit 
procedures. It is entrusted with periodically verifying compliance by Telecom Italia 
with current telecommunications and antitrust regulations. 
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3.7.4 Directors’ Compensation 
The total compensation paid in 1998 by Telecom Italia or by any of Telecom Italia 
subsidiaries to the members of the board of directors and to the executive officers was 
Lit. 26,162 million and the total compensation paid in 1998 to the members of the 
Board of Statutory Auditors was Lit. 998 million. 
At the Shareholders’ Meeting of December 15, 1998, Telecom Italia shareholders 
passed a resolution authorizing a capital increase of up to 74,000,000 Telecom Italia 
ordinary shares (approximately 1% of the share capital) over a five year period, for 
the implementation of a management stock option plan. To date the Board of 
Directors had neither issued specific guidelines as to the performance parameters for 
the distribution of the authorized stock options, nor identified the managers who will 
be the potential beneficiaries of the plan. 
 
Provisions for Minor Shareholders: Voto di Lista 
Pursuant to Telecom Italia’s by-laws, the election of directors and statutory 
auditors, other than those appointed pursuant to the special powers described above or 
designated pursuant to the Public Concessions, is made through the “voto di lista” 
system. This system has been used for the first time to elect directors of Telecom 
Italia at the ordinary Shareholders’ Meeting held at the end of October 1997. The 
“voto di lista” system is primarily aimed at ensuring that minority shareholders are 
represented on the board of directors and board of statutory auditors. For the board of 
directors, such requirement is not subject to amendment so long as the maximum limit 
on shareholding remains effective; for the board of statutory auditors, representation 
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of minority shareholders is mandatory. By the “voto di lista” system, the board of 
directors is elected on the basis of lists or slates of candidates presented by the 
shareholders or by the outgoing board of directors; candidates are listed by means of 
progressive numbers. Each shareholder may submit only one slate, and each candidate 
may appear only on one slate. Only those shareholders who alone or together with 
other shareholders hold a total number of shares representing at least 1% of the share 
capital entitled to vote at the shareholders’ meeting may submit slates. Each person 
entitled to vote may vote for only one slate. Four-fifths of the directors to be elected 
are chosen from the slate that obtains a majority of the shareholders’ vote in the 
progressive order in which they are listed on the slate. The remaining directors are 
chosen from the other slates; the votes obtained by the various slates are successively 
divided by one, two, three or four, depending on the number of directors to be chosen, 
and the quotients obtained are assigned progressively to candidates on each of these 
slates, in the order respectively specified on the slate. The quotients thus assigned to 
the candidates on the various slates are arranged in a single decreasing order. Those 
candidates who have obtained the highest quotients are elected to the board of 
directors. The election of the board of statutory auditors are governed by the same 
procedures used for the election of the board of directors as far as presentation, filing 
and publication of slates are concerned. If the board of statutory auditors is composed 
of three members one member of the board of statutory auditors must be taken from 
the minority slate that obtains the largest number of votes. Two members must be 
taken from such minority state if the board of statutory auditors is composed of more 
than three members. 
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3.7.5 Takeover Case: Telecom Italia and Olivetti 
Telecom Italia, the world’s 11th-largest telecommunications group, has undergone 
two years of extraordinary change and turbulence. Its chairman changed three times in 
12 months and its top management has been in a state of intense turmoil. Little has 
gone right for it since its board promised shareholders better performance early last 
year. Increased competition is partly to blame, but Telecom Italia has lost its way 
because of managerial infighting, strategic confusion and an ineffective group of core 
shareholders. 
Olivetti, the much smaller information technology and telecommunications group, 
launched, at the end of February, Europe’s biggest post-war hostile takeover bid 
involving a highly leveraged offer totaling L102,000 billion – or $65billion – for its 
giant Italian rival.  
Ever since Olivetti launched a hostile takeover bid for Telecom Italia in February, 
there has been speculation about a white knight coming to the rescue. On April 21st 
Telecom Italia’s board backed a shareswapping merger with Deutsche Telekom that 
values the Italian group at $70 billion, a $5 billion more than Olivetti had been 
offering. If Telecom Italia and Deutsche Telekom get their way, they will create a 
telecoms monster with a market capitalization about $175 billion and 3000,000 
employees. However, most can see little point in increase in scale that Deutsche 
Telekom and Telecom Italia will achieve 
In fact, the two groups are hardly text-book candidates for value-creation through 
integration. Their fixed-line phone franchises do not overlap. Telecom Italia is strong 
in mobile phone services, and has expanded into Latin America. Deutsche Telekom is 
more interested in on-line access and eastern Europe. 
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True, some analysts point to the complementarities and cost-cutting potential. But, 
the deal carries risks, especially for Deutsche Telekom. It would distract the company 
from its own restructuring program, which has already led to 30,000 layoffs but needs 
to go much deeper. It will introduce management tensions: the plan is that the Mr. 
Sommer and Bernabé would together run the merged group, but both are famously 
strong-willed. Telecom Italia’s Machiavellian corporate culture may clash with that of 
ex-civil-servants in Deutsche Telekom’s middle management. 
These are the features of the possible merge talk between Telecom Italia and 
Deutsche Telekom that suggest shareholder interests aren’t its underlying force. 
Managers of Telecom Italia may be faced with a conflict of interest between their 
fiduciary responsibilities and their own potential losses. However, a messy 
compromise at a company that is so lacking in direction and so badly in need of 
restructuring would be the worst possible outcome.  
As of March 31, 1999, the stable shareholders – institutional investors -  owned, 
in the aggregate, 8.11% of the shares. All the stabel shareholders, except for Credit 
Suisse Group, tendered their shares in the Olivetti offer which close on May 21, 1999. 
On May 25, 1999, the majority of Telecom Italia board of directors tendered their 
resignation; as a result according to Telecom Italia’s by-laws, the entire board of 
directors has to be renewed and a new Chief Executive Officer has to be appointed. 
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3.8 Telstra Corporation Limited 
3.8.1 Overview 
Telstra is a full service telecommunications carrier offering local, domestic, long 
distance and international services throughout Australia, as well as a wide range of 
other telecommunications services, including digital and analogue cellular mobile 
services, advanced business services, directory services, pay phones and operator 
assisted services. The number of employees is 66,760 and total assets amount to AUD 
25,683 mil on 30 Jun., 1998. 
The Commonwealth owns 66.7 per cent of the shares of the Telstra Entity. The 
Commonwealth, as holder of 66.7 per cent of the Shares in the Telstra entity, like any 
other majority shareholder in an Australian company, has the ability to control the 
company.5 The interests of directors in the company’s shares are 441,910 shares, 
which is about 0.0034% of total shares.  
Telstra has a unitary board with majority of non-executive directors and separates 
CEO and Chairman. The government owns two-third of ordinary Telstra shares and 
regulates it with a variety of measures. Telstra’s compensation scheme, however, has 
long-term incentive plan similar to that of British Telecom, a privatized utility.  
 
 
                                                          
5 The Telstra Act precludes any reduction in the Commonwealth’s voting rights, paid-up 
capital or rights to distributions of capital or profit, if any, below a two-thirds interest in 
Telstra without amending legislation. The Telstra Act deems the Commonwealth Auditor-
General to have been appointed as the auditor of Telstra for the purposes of the Australian 
Corporations Law. The Telsta Act restricts foreign ownership to less than 20%, of the total 
number of issued Shares 
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3.8.2 Composition of Board 
As at 26 August 1998 there were 11 Directors on the Board – 10 non-executive 
Directors, including the Chairman, and the Chief Executive Officer. The maximum 
number of Directors fixed by Telstra’s Articles of Association, in the absence of a 
resolution of shareholders to the contrary, is 13. Telstra’s adopted so-called staggered 
board. Apart from the Chief executive Officer, one third of the Directors are subject to 
re-election by rotation each year. 
 
3.8.3 Principal Board Committees 
Telstra’s principal committees are as follows: 
(1) Audit & Compliance Committee: The role of this committee is to provide 
oversight of the Group’s compliance with external and internal obligations, review of 
the annual audit program, overseeing Telstra’s risk management program and to 
provide advice to the Board on matters of due diligence, financial systems integrity 
and financial risks. 
(2) Appointments, Nominations & Compensation Committee - The role of this 
committee is to oversee the composition of the Board, the performance of the Board 
and the appointment and the remuneration of the Chairman, Directors, Chief 
Executive Officer and senior executives.  
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3.8.4 Directors’ Compensation 
For the 1998 fiscal year, the aggregate amount of remuneration earned by the 
Directors and Executive Officers of Telstra as a group was A$7,677,165. This amount 
consists of: 
• A$513,572 that has been set aside or accrued by Telstra during fiscal 1998 to 
provide pension and retirement benefits; and  
• A$7,163,593 representing remuneration, other than amounts for pension and 
retirement benefits.  
The remuneration package for executive directors comprises Basic salary and 
Management Incentive Plan (MIP) , and Long-Term Incentive plan (LTP) 
Management Incentive Plan (MIP): The Management Incentive Plan (MIP) is an 
annual plan open to all executives in the Telstra Group. The amount at risk (target 
incentive) varies between 10% and 22% of the total remuneration package depending 
on the executive’s role. The plan is based on performance against set targets for 
Corporate, Business Unit and individual measures. The measures include financial, 
customer service and individual measures that support the Telstra Group’s key 
business objectives. Before any MIP is payable a certain threshold must be reached, 
according to the predefined measures. The plan also provides that payments are 
capped.  
Long-Term Incentive plan (LTI): Selected senior executives who contribute 
significantly to the future long term profitability and success of the Telstra Group also 
participate in a Long Term Incentive Plan (LTI). At target, the LTI comprises 16% to 
19% of the total remuneration package depending on the executive’s level. Any 
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payment made under this plan depends on the achievement of return on investment 
targets over a three year period. The plan, which began in 1994, also includes an 
annual payment based on the dividend declared in respect of earnings. 
 
Non-Executive Directors’ Remuneration 
Remuneration of non-executive directors is determined by the board within the 
parameters approved by shareholders from time to time. The maximum aggregate 
amount of non-executive directors’ remuneration provided for at present is A$750,000. 
This remuneration is for all services provided by the directors as directors including 
service on committees. Directors are also entitled to be reimbursed for reasonable 
travelling, accommodation and other expenses incurred in travelling to or from 
meetings of the board or committees or when otherwise engaged on the business of 
the company in accordance with board policy. 
 
3.9 Korea Telecom Corp. 
3.9.1 Overview 
Korea Telecom is the largest and leading provider of telecommunications services 
offering nationwide local & long distance call services, overseas call services 
throughout Korea, as well as a wide range of other telecommunications services, 
including multimedia Services, satellite communications services, directory services, 
pay phones and operator assisted services. The number of employees is 56,887 and 
total assets amount to KRW 170,152 mil on 31 December, 1998. 
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The Government held an approximate 71.2% direct stake in Korea Telecom at 
December 31, 1998.6 The interests of directors in the company’s shares are 2,650 
shares, which is about 0.000001% of total ordinary shares. CEO and vice president do 
not have shares at all. Neither do the outside directors. 
Korea Telecom has a unitary board with majority of outside directors, pursuant to a 
special Act. Its executive compensation scheme lacks stock-based incentives, and is 
more or less short-term result oriented. 
 
3.9.2 Composition of Board 
Korea Telecom board’s outside directors comprise more than half, which is subject 
to ‘The Act on Privatization and Management Reform of Public Enterprises’. Korea 
Telecom Board consists of seven outside directors and six executive officers. The 
CEO does not hold the position of the chairman. However, majority outside directors 
does not automatically imply ‘independence’. The line ministry is able to continue to 
influence indirectly as well as directly the management, for it is allowed to appoint 
outside directors. The line ministry used to and still considers Korea Telecom as 
means of policy implementation, which is not always compatible with shareholder 
value maximization. The majority share ownership is not automatically linked to the 
economic residual of the enterprise. 
 
 
                                                          
6 The government held about 59% stake in Korea Telecom after Depository Receipt issue in 
1999. 
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3.9.3 Principal Board Committees 
Korea Telecom’s five principal committees are as follows: 
(1) Management committee, (2) Finance committee, (3) Investment committee, (4) 
Public interest committee, and (5) Marketing committee. These committees have an 
advisory role on matters in their respective area with the objective of overseeing the 
interests of shareholders and encouraging sound corporate governance, if such 
committee exists. 
 
3.9.4 Directors’ Compensation 
The total amount of remuneration allotted to the directors totaled 1,170 million 
Won.  
The remuneration package for executive directors comprises Basic salary and 
Annual bonus. Consistent with cost control, no salary increases were made for 
executive officers or other senior managers of the Company in 1999 
Annual bonus: The annual bonus plan is designed to focus on annual objectives 
and to reward senior executives appropriately for the results achieved against these 
objectives. Targets are set at the start of the financial year based on key corporate 
objectives – such as EVA, revenue per employee, customer satisfaction and R&D. 
Different weight is assigned to each objective. Bonus awards ranges 0 to 200% of 
basic salary. 44% of the total remuneration was paid pursuant to such bonus 
arrangement.  
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Stock Option 
The contract between the board and CEO has stock option clause, however, the 
board has neither proposed a stock option plan at the shareholder meeting, nor issued 
specific guidelines for the implementation of a management stock option plan yet 
.  
Other Remuneration  
Insurance: Korea Telecom provides directors with director liability insurance of 
which the purpose is to have the directors become risk-taking by providing safeguards 
against substantial legal liabilities through class action suits initiated by shareholders, 
the plaintiff’s bar, an others. The legal liability incentives are more often consistent 
with minimizing downside risk rather than maximizing value (Jensen 1983). Other 
researchers have formally shown that incentive-compensation plans motivate 
managers to take on more risk. It is unlikely that such defensive a measure as the 
insurance could lead to proper decision control and decision management that create 
efficiency and value for the company. 
 
Outside Directors’ Remuneration 
The outside directors received an annual cash retainer and expenses linked to their 
attendance at meetings are reimbursed.  
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Summary and Conclusion 
 
This paper reviewed the existing literature on the issues on corporate governance: 
internal corporate governance structure and agency problems in external corporate 
governance. The existing literature suggests that firm performance has a positive 
correlation with the percentage of executive compensation that is equity based and the 
percentage of equity held by managers. These findings support tying executive 
compensation more closely to firm performance. 
The case studies of seven telecom operators provideded a better understanding of 
governance change.  
First, the board structure has little relation with firm performance in the 
telecommunications industry, which was suggested by Mehran (1995). This finding is 
in a sense insignificant partly due to the small sample. However, the finding should be 
interpreted with caution, and the distorting force of price regulation by the 
government should be taken into consideration. 
Second, The proliferation of deregulation in telecommunications industry has 
changed the systems of management incentives. The telcos have begun to emphasize 
the variable portion of the executive compensation, and especially the increase in 
long-term incentives. Among the seven telcos, companies with diffuse share 
ownership employ equity-based incentive system in order to reduce agency cost and 
align executives’ interests with those of shareholders. The telcos under stricter 
regulation, on the contrary, often lack equity-based or long-term incentive plans and 
could be vulnerable to managers’ short-termism without proper monitoring 
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mechanism.  
Finally, the takeover case of Telecom Italia provided an example of the agency 
problem in the market for corporate control. Even though the Olivetti offer was not in 
the best interests of Telecom Italia shareholders, the merger plan between Deutsche 
Telekom and Telecom Italia was rather a value-destruction than shareholder value 
maximization one. After failing to achieve Deutsche Telekom–Telecom Italia 
combination, the entire board of directors were renewed and a new CEO was 
appointed. With rapid privatization and deregulation, the market for corporate control 
becomes a mechanism for resolving owner-manager conflicts. 
Korea Telecom’s corporate governance continues to evolve as the company moves 
from a government-owned business enterprise to a major publicly-listed company 
with a wide shareholder base. While the government plans to privatize Korea Telecom, 
it owns more than 50 percent of the shares of Korea Telecom and the company still 
remains subject to various ministerial and other controls to which other publicly-listed 
companies are not subject. Nevertheless, within these constraints, the board should 
continue to strive to achieve best corporate governance practice. 
In general, public enterprises take much time to change fundamentally from the old 
regime that was based upon the view that public enterprises are instruments of the 
government in its pursuit of public policies. And the government lacks systematic 
incentive to monitor the management of the public enterprises.  
Korea Telecom’s current remuneration package for the directors does not provide 
enough incentive to pursue long-term shareholder value maximization. I suggest that 
Korea Telecom should design long-term incentive plans and apply it to executive 
directors. A future compensation scheme should give outsider directors share 
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ownership targets in order to align independent directors’ interests with those of 
shareholders who receive the economic residual of the enterprise. In introducing long-
term incentives, I would recommend the expanded use of stock options deeper in the 
organization. 
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Basic Figures of Selected Telcos 
1998 fiscal year 
 Revenue
(million) 
Assets 
(million) 
Net Income
(million) 
Number of  
Employees 
Net Income 
/Assets 
AT&T 
(USD) 
53,223 59,550 5,245 107,800 8.81%
BT 
(GBP) 
15,640 23,285 1,706 124,900 7.33%
DT 
(DEM) 
69,861 155,078 4,388 203,374 2.83%
FT 
(FRF) 
161,678 287,197 15,085 165,042 5.25%
NTT 
(Yen) 
9,450,000 17,353,000 214,000 230,000 1.23%
Telecom 
Italia(ITL) 
46,550,000 87,614,000 5,252,000 126,097 5.99%
Telstra 
(AUD) 
16,819 25,683 3,004 66,760 11.70%
KT 
(KRW) 
8,773,912 17,015,197 258,319 56,887 1.52%
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